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THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT FOR INVOLUNTARILY
COMMITTED SEX OFFENDERS IN THE WAKE OF
KANSAS V. HENDRiCKS 1
David DePugh*

INTRODUCTION

In December of 1997, aides to Governor George Pataki
stated that the following year Pataki would seek legislation that
would extend confinement of sex offenders after their criminal
sentences had been served.2 The state would continue to hold sex
offenders, not for their criminal liability, but under a rationale of
civil incarceration.3 Thus, the extended confinement would not
officially be a continuation of the felon's punishment. Rather, the
incarceration would consist of an involuntary commitment of a
mentally ill person.
During the 1998 legislative session, the New York State
Senate passed this proposed bill.4 However, the State Assembly
referred the bill to the rules committee for further study, and the
Assembly never officially voted on it.5 In 1999, a new bill

J.D. candidate, May 1999, State University of New York at Buffalo School
of Law. Master of Arts, 1990, Binghamton University. Bachelor of Science,
1988, Cornell University.
521 U.S. 346, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (1997).
2 Pataki Seeks Confinement for Sex Fiends Would Hold Offenders in
Psychiatric Centers After Prison Terms, BUFF. NEWS, Dec. 12, 1997, at Al.
"Governor Pataki will seek legislation next year to keep some violent offenders
locked up after they finish their prison terms, aides said Thursday."
3 Id.
4

S. 7659, 221st Leg. (NY 1998); listed in State ofNew York Legislative

Digest,Legislative Bill Drafting Commission, Albany NY (1998) at S461.
' A.3395, 221st Leg. (NY 1998); listed in Id. at A641.
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providing for the civil commitment of sexually violent predators
has been introduced to both the State Senate and Assembly.
Such legislation has ample precedent in other states. As of
March, 1999, thirteen states have similar laws on their books.7 In
1997, the United States Supreme Court upheld the strictest of these
laws in Kansas v. Hendricks.8 Writing for the Court, Justice
Clarence Thomas held that the Act satisfied substantive due
process requirements for civil commitment, and that involuntary
civil confinement pursuant to the Act was not punitive, thus
precluding the finding of a double jeopardy or ex post facto
violation.9
A legal problem remains for these statutes: must sexual
offenders be offered continued treatment in order for involuntary
civil commitment to be constitutional? Although all members of
the Court seem to agree that these laws do not facially violate the
Constitution, the Justices remain sharply divided regarding the
necessity of continuing treatment for sex offenders, both during
their criminal sentences and their civil incarceration. Judging from
Justice Anthony Kennedy's concurrence,"° a majority of the Court
Governor's Program Bill No. 4, 1999 Memorandum. The bill number in the
Senate is S.1593, 222d Leg. (NY 1999); the bill number in the Assembly is
A.3395, 222d Leg. (NY 1999).
7 ARIz. REv. STAT. § 36-3701 et seq. (West 1998); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 6600 et. seq. (West 1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.21 et. seq. (West 1999);
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 207/1-99 (West 1998); 1998 IowA LEGIS. SERV.
§ 229A.1 et. seq. (West); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 et seq. (1998); MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 253B.02 (sub.18C), 253B.185 (West 1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§
632.480-632.513 (West 1999); 1998 SESS. LAW SERV. CH. N.J. 71 (West); N.D.
CENT. CODE N.D. § 25-03.3 (1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-10 et. seq. (Law
Co-op 1998); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.09 et. seq. (West 1999); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 980.01 et. seq. (West 1998).
8 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (1997).
9 Id. at 2074-75.
10 Id. at 2087. "If the object or purpose of the Kansas law had been to provide
treatment but treatment provisions were adopted as a sham or mere pretext,
there would have been an indication of the forbidden purpose to punish." This
6
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actually maintains that a state which denied, or neglected to
provide, psychological treatment for offenders would be violating
that offender's constitutional rights.
This article argues that such a right to treatment for
involuntarily committed sex offenders is mandated by the
Constitution and by Supreme Court jurisprudence. Part I of this
article will explore the applicable legal theories that support the
state's power to civilly commit persons involuntarily: parens
patriae and the police powers. Part II will apply these two legal
theories to a substantive due process analysis of sexually violent
predator laws. Parts III and IV will analyze the two major
constitutional rationales for a committed person's right to
treatment: the eighth and fourteenth amendments, respectively.
Part V will move on to the issue of adequacy of treatment, and Part
VI will address the selection and implementation of treatment. This
section will then analyze special legal problems that treatment of
sex offenders presents including predictions of future
dangerousness, and the requirement that sex offenders confess to
their crimes before beginning therapy. Finally, Part VII will
analyze the Kansas v. Hendricks decision and determine its impact
on the right to treatment and the constitutionality of sexually
violent predator statutes.
I.

PARENS PATRIAE VS. POLICE POWER

Two predominant legal theories govern involuntary civil
commitment: the state's parens patriae powers and police
powers. 1 Parenspatriae literally means "parent of the country",
and refers to the state's duty to care for those who cannot care for

statement agrees with one of the dissenting opinion's main points. See Id. at
2090-92.
"

Deborah L. Morris, Note, Constitutional Implications of the Involuntary

Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators - A Due Process Analysis, 82
CORNELL L. REv. 594, 624 (1997).
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themselves.' 2 Under this theory, the state may commit persons
against their will if they are a danger to themselves.' 3 This rationale
applies both to convicted criminals and to those who have not
committed any crimes and do not pose any danger whatever to
others. 4 Once a state takes this action, it assumes an obligation to
treat such persons. 5 The goal of the commitment under such
circumstances is to help such persons develop to the point where
they can take care of themselves.' 6 A state's refusal to provide
treatment to such persons constitutes a violation of, among other
things, their right to habilitation."
The parens patriae theory is grounded in "the tenets of
S
fundamental fairness embodied in the due process clause."'
In the case of sex offenders, the state's concern does not
rest primarily with those individuals constituting a danger to
themselves. The state's primary concern is the dangers such
mentally ill persons pose to others. To deal with this problem, the
state operates under another source of authority: its police powers.
The police powers embody the
12
13

14

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 114 (6th ed. 1990).
Morris, supra note 11, at 624.
Id.

Is Id.
16 Id.
17 See Clark v. Cohen, 794 F.2d 79, 92-97 (3d Cir. 1986). "Habilitation" refers

to a person's ability to perform basic self-care functions.

Id. at 94. The Clark court then quoted two cases: "To deprive any citizen of
his or her liberty upon the altruistic theory that the confinement is for humane
therapeutic reasons and then fail to provide adequate treatment violates the very
fundamentals of due process." Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F.Supp. 781, 785 (M.D.
Ala. 1971); "[Where] the rationale for confinement is the paren patriae rationale
... the due process clause requires that minimally adequate treatment be in fact
provided." Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 521 (5" Cir. 1974). The latter
quote was the first Court of Appeals case to expressly adopt the parens patriae
approach. However, the Donaldson court added the crucial clause that
"constitutionally minimal standards of treatment be established and enforced...
at least for the nondangerous patient [emphasis suppliedi." Obviously, sex
offenders would fall within the potential loophole of dangerouspatients.
S
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authority conferred by the American constitutional
system in the Tenth Amendment . . . upon the
individual states, and, in turn, delegated to local
governments, through which they are enabled to...
secure generally the comfort, safety, morals, health,
and prosperity of its citizens by preserving the
public order, preventing a conflict of rights in the
common intercourse of the citizens, and insuring to
each an uninterrupted enjoyment of all the
privileges conferred upon him or her by general

laws. 19
These police powers include the state's right to incarcerate
persons, whether criminally or civilly, who threaten the rest of
society." Incarcerating sane criminals is relatively straightforward:
if the prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the
accused actually committed the alleged crime, then the state
incarcerates the person for the determined sentence.2
Things become more complex when the state moves to
civilly incarcerate its mentally ill citizens. The Supreme Court
mandated a two prong test for civil commitment in Addington v.
Texas.22 The state must prove by "clear and convincing evidence"
that (1) an individual is dangerous to others and (2) the individual
suffers from a mental illness.2
Regarding mentally ill noncriminals, the state confining
them under the police powers operates under a quid pro quo
theory. This theory functions under the assumption that
confinement entails a "massive curtailment of liberty." 24 Because
1156 (6th ed. 1990).
Morris, supranote 11, at 627-28.
21 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
' Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
23 Id. at 432-33.
24 Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972).
19
20

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

76

BUFFALO PUBLIC INTEREST LAW JOURNAL

confining mentally
problematic,"

ill

noncriminals

is

VOL.

XVII

"constitutionally

to justify it the state must give the civilly committed
persons something in exchange for their loss of
liberty... According to the quid pro quo theory,
due process dictates that the benefit to which the
involuntarily civilly committed are entitled is
habilitation to enable them to leave their
commitment... Habilitation is the constitutionally
required quidpro quo for civil confinement.25
Civil confinement of mentally ill criminals raises another
dilemma. The quidpro quo theory contains the assumption that the
individual committed no crime, so therefore the state must provide
the individual with some benefit to compensate for the
confinement.26 In the case of convicted sex offenders, however,
they most certainly have committed crimes, and have been
punished for them.
One might conclude that the completed crimes
consequently relieve the state of providing any benefit to sex
offenders, therefore no obligation for treatment exists. However,
such logic neglects the very rationale behind the extended civil
incarceration of convicted criminals. Sex offender statutes
predicate themselves on the assumption that they are no longer
punishing the offenders. Punishment is the rationale for criminal
incarceration, but not for civil commitment.
The motive for civil commitment under the police powers
rationale is, first and foremost, protecting society by keeping
dangerous individuals locked up.27 The Supreme Court indicated in

2

Clark v. Cohen ,794 F.2d 79, 93-94 (3rd Cir. 1986).

26

Id.At 93-94.

27

Morris, supra note 11, at 627-28.
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United States v. Salerno" that confinement outside the parameters
of criminal convictions does not necessarily violate the Due
Process Clause. Some government interests may justify such
action.2 9 However, if the government insists on extending an
offender's confinement on the basis of that offender's mental
illness, a constitutional problem arises if the government fails to
offer treatment for that illness.30
Since prisoners are in no position to seek their own
psychiatric help, the state's failure to provide treatment effectively
amounts to a refusal to allow prisoners to receive treatment and
eventually get well. Because sex offender statutes tend to mandate
that prisoners not be released until they are cured, or at least until
they are no longer a danger to others 31 (which arguably amounts to
the same thing), the failure to provide treatment effectively
mandates a life sentence for offenders unless they somehow "cure"
themselves.

IL

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR LAWS

The Supreme Court has struggled with the substantive due
process 32 limitations regarding the constitutionality of sexually
violent predator laws. Such analysis has important implications for
the right to treatment. Some commentators argue that if the state
uses a parenspatriae rationale for committing sex offenders, then
2
29

United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
Id. at 740. Such governmental interests include "particularly acute problems

such as crime by arrestees."
30

Id.

See ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-3701 (West 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 592924 (West 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B 12 (West 1998).
31

"Substantive due process - such may be broadly defined as the constitutional
guarantee that no person shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life, liberty or
32

property; the essence of substantive due process is protection from arbitrary and
unreasonable action." BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY 1281 (5th ed. 1979).
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treatment constitutes the primary concern. 33 If the state uses the
police powers rationale, on the other hand, then "the existence of a
mental illness must be proved and treatment concerns disappear."34
Many analysts vehemently reject the argument that
treatment concerns disappear under the police powers. One such
commentator maintains, "The constitutionally permissible purpose
of police power involuntary civil commitment is to treat the
individual's mental illness and to protect the person and society
from the person's potential dangerousness."35 Under such an
analysis, the state's obligation to treat the confined person never
disappears, regardless of the theoretical rationale.
The Supreme Court's view on this dilemma previously
seemed ambiguous. In Allen v. Illinois,a6 the Court actually
appeared to lean towards a parens patriae approach, with the
police power rationale merely supplementing the analysis.
However, critics of this line of reasoning argue that such a
framework eventually undercuts the rationale for keeping sex
offenders locked up.37 The state's legitimacy for confining
dangerous individuals would diminish, or vanish, if the persons
were capable of taking care of themselves.38
Some recent legal scholarship endorses such a view, and
asserts that "civil commitment is appropriate only when an
individual's mental impairments render the person incompetent or
unable to control his behavior."39 Two professors, Bruce Winick
and Robert Schopp, have presented two different legal theories that
" See Morris, supranote 11, at 639.
14 Id. at 639-40.
'5 Beth Keiko Fijimoto, cmt, Sexual Violence, Sanity, and Safety:
ConstitutionalParametersfor Involuntary Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders,
15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 879, 888 (1992).
36
37

Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986).
See Morris, supranote 11, at 642.

Id.
Eric S. Janus, Toward A Conceptual Framework For Assessing Police
Power Commitment Legislation: A Critique Of Schopp's And Winick's
38

39

Explications OfLegal Mental Illness, 76 NEB. L. REv. 1, 4 (1997).
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support such a proposition. Operating on the assumption that civil
commitment is an "essentially medical" intervention, Winick
argues that the confinement must be therapeutically appropriate. 0
Furthermore, Winick asserts that only severe impairments of
mental functioning could justify involuntary confinement, and
consequently personality disorders and sexual paraphilias (the
disorders that most often afflict sex offenders) cannot serve as
legitimate bases for civil commitment.41
Winick's argument that psychiatric hospitalization only
produces significant results for some disorders and under certain
circumstances has ample support from psychiatric scholarship.42
But as Professor Eric Janus points out, such an analysis begs the
question of whether confinement becomes constitutionally
permissible if the state somehow redesigns the treatment so that it
varies from the standard hospitalization model and directly
responds to the sex offenders' disorders.43 As a concrete recent
example, the Minnesota sex offender statute provided for
confinement in a specially designed facility for sexual disorders.'
Numerous other specialized therapies have been used on sex
offenders in the past.
More importantly, Winick's argument that sex offenders'
disorders are not "severe" enough to justify confinement
demonstrates that he has in fact refused to even consider the police
powers rationale - that the state has the constitutional right to
Bruce J. Winick, Ambiguities in the Legal Meaning and Significance of
Mental Illness, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL. & L. 534 (1995).
41 Id. at 539-40.
40

42

Id.

" See Janus, supra note 39, at 14-15.
Id. at 14-15.
41 John C. Roberts, Note, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness & the Right to
Treatment, 77 YALE L. J. 87, 105-07 (1967), has described various treatments

4

that have been used with varying success on sex offenders, including group
therapy, occupational therapy, recreational therapy, psychodrama, drugs,

somatic therapies (insulin shock and electro-convulsive therapy), punishment
itself, and environmental or milieu therapy.
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protect the welfare of its citizens. The fact that these disorders
result in the unconscionable victimization of many persons,
including children, by definition should classify such mental
illnesses in the severe category and consequently legitimize the
confinement. Janus acknowledges that Winick's model yields
different results if viewed from a police powers perspective:
Because protecting the public from violence is the
purpose of these commitments, disorders such as
antisocial personality disorder or paraphilias, which
arguably "predispose' the individual to violence,
would be sufficient to justify commitment since
they produce 'functional impairment in a way that
relates to the justifications for involuntary
hospitalization.' 46
Professor Schopp shares Winick's conclusion that only
impaired fundamental psychological capacities such as cognition
and volition suffice to justify civil commitment.47 However,
Schopp utilizes a rights/status analysis rather than a strict medical
treatment analysis. He maintains that only those who do not
"qualify" for sovereignty (i.e., those whose psychological
impairments render them incapable of rendering autonomous
decisions) may be civilly committed.4"
Janus also arrives at a similar conclusion, but with yet
another rationale:
Incompetent individuals are subject to the civil
commitment power not because their mental
impairments diminish their personhood or their
46
47

Janus, supra note 39, at 22.
See Robert F. Schopp, Sexual Predators and the Structure of the Mental

Health System: Expanding the Normative Focus of Therapeutic Jurisprudence,
1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL. & L. 161 (1995).
41 Id. at 174-81.
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rights, but because the state's social control interests
can be vindicated in no other way. Subjecting
competent
individuals
to
police
power
commitments would destroy the primacy, and thus
the moral force, of the criminal law.49
Professor John Kip Cornwell reasonably asserts that such
arguments rely too heavily on parenspatriae concerns rather than
police power concerns. ° If the state obtains sufficient evidence that
an individual has the propensity to commit harmful sexual acts,
then the state's responsibility to protect the community justifies an
expanded legal definition of mental illness."
When Washington state implemented its sex offender
statute, the police powers rationale was foremost in the minds of
the Governor's Task Force on Community Protection, the body
assigned to draft the new law. 2 As District Attorney and Task
Force member David Boerner later noted,
The police power is 'the least limitable of the
exercises of government' because it is a response to
the collective need for self-defense. Collective selfdefense, the coming together of individuals to create
communities that will protect them from dangers,
must surely be at the very core of the rationale
behind the police power. The limits on police power
would come from the legislation enacted through
the democratic process and the jury, and in the form
of procedural protections."
4 Janus, supranote 39, at 50.
SO John Kip Cornwell, Protection and Treatment: Civil Detention of Sex
Offenders, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1293, 1332 (1996).
.Id. at 1332.
52 David Boerner, Confronting Violence: In the Act and in the Word, 15 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 525, 558 (1992).
11 Id. at 558.
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Boemer's task force concluded that if the state "acted rationally
and with due care for procedural protections," then sex offender
statutes could survive any constitutional challenges in the courts. 4
III. EIGHTH AMENDMENT RATIONALE FOR THE RIGHT TO
TREATMENT

The right to treatment has been hotly debated for decades.
In the past thirty years, the constitutional debate has centered
around two major arguments: the eighth amendment rationale and
the fourteenth amendment rationale. Under the eighth amendment
rationale, depriving involuntarily committed persons of an
opportunity to be treated and to become cured of their mental
illness constitutes cruel and unusual punishment."
An early case on this issue was Rouse v. Cameron." Judge
Bazelon, for the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals,
began with the simple proposition that the purpose of involuntary
hospitalization is treatment, not punishment (i.e. the parenspatriae
approach)." The court then concluded that involuntarily committed
persons had a right to treatment. 8 The court noted both the fact
that Congress mandated a statutory right to treatment in the 1964

"' Id.at 558. This confidence turned out to be misplaced. In Young v. Weston,

898 F.Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1995), the federal district court ruled that
Washington's Sexually Violent Predator statute unconstitutionally violated
substantive due process, double jeopardy and ex postfacto concerns. However,
in the wake of Kansas v. Hendricks, Washington passed another Sexually
Violent Predator statute.
" See Roberts, supra note 45, at 97-100 (1967); Vicki L. Plaut, Punishment
Versus Treatment of the Guilty But Mentally 11l, J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY

428, 444-49 (1983).
56 Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C.Cir. 1966).
17 Id. at 452-53.

58 Id. at 453-56. These constitutional issues included due process and equal
protection problems.
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Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act59 and that involuntary
commitment created some troubling constitutional problems.6 °
In Robinson v. California,6' the United States Supreme
Court approached the right to treatment obliquely. Striking down a
statute that made it a crime to be addicted to the use of narcotics,
the Court reasoned in dicta that confinement was not itself
punishment.62 The Court declared that a "state might determine that
the general health and welfare require that victims of [mental
disease, leprosy, or venereal disease] be dealt with by compulsory63
treatment, involving quarantine, confinement, or sequestration.,
One strong interpretation of Robinson is that all involuntary
confinement should be considered cruel and unusual punishment
unless the state offers treatment": "Their sickness may make them
dangerous to the rest of us; but if they are to be confined for a
condition which they are neither responsible for nor able to
combat, there should be a reciprocal obligation for society to
65
attempt to help them.,
However, two notable problems exist with such an
approach. First, those insane persons who are untreatable given
psychiatry's current state of knowledge could feasibly be set free
under such a rationale." Second, the insufficiency of money and
resources to provide the ideal level of treatment could feasibly be
used as a reason to free dangerous persons.67 Judge Bazelon
indicated as much in his Rouse v. Cameron decision: "Continuing
failure to provide suitable and adequate treatment cannot be

§ 21-562 (Supp V, 1966).
6 Rouse, 373 F.2d at 453-54.
61 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
62 Id. at 666.
59 D. C. CODE ANN.

63

Id.

"

Roberts, supranote 45, at 98.

65

Id.

6Id.
67

Id. at 98-99.
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justified by lack of staff or facilities."6 Clearly, any approach that
compels the state to release insane dangerous persons back into
society due to factors beyond the state's control needs to be
reexamined.
The U.S. Supreme Court directly addressed the eighth
amendment rationale for a right to treatment for all prisoners in
Estelle v. Gamble.69 The Court premised its opinion on the
common law theory that the public must "be required to care for
the prisoner, who cannot by reason of the deprivation of his liberty,
care for himself."7' However, the Court held that no constitutional
right was implicated by an inadvertent failure to provide adequate
treatment. If the state made a good faith effort to deal with a
prisoner's medical problems, that prisoner would be precluded
from successfully making a constitutional claim.7' Estelle set the
new constitutional standard, that an inmate's rights were violated
only if the state demonstrated "deliberate indifference to serious
72
medical needs or an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain."
Although this standard technically applied to both physical and
mental illnesses, in practice courts often gave the state far more
leeway regarding providing treatment for mental illness.73 Even in
those circuits which explicitly declare that the Estelle standard
applies equally to mental and physical illnesses, the standard can
hardly be seen as a strict demand for adequate treatment.

6S

Rouse, 373 F.2d at 457.

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). All prisoners means those with
serious physical or mental health needs.
70 Id. at 104 (quoting Spicer v. Williamson, 1323 S.E. 291, 293 (N.C. 1926)).
7, Id. at 105-06.
72 Id. at 104 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)).
See Plaut, supranote 55, at 445.
69
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FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS RATIONALE
FOR THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT

Courts and analysts have generally argued that the right to
treatment enjoys a stronger rationale under a due process analysis
derived from the fourteenth amendment." Federal circuits
sometimes addressed the issue squarely by quoting the Humphrey
doctrine that civil commitment involves a "massive curtailment of
liberty" which triggers strict due process analysis." The courts then
progressed to the next step and held that civil commitment satisfied
due process only if treatment accompanied confinement.76
The U.S. Supreme Court, in contrast to the Circuit Courts,
consistently avoided due process issues regarding the right to
treatment for years. O'Connorv. Donaldson" involved a man held
against his will for fifteen years in a Florida mental hospital.
Donaldson claimed that he was neither dangerous nor mentally ill,
and that the state failed to provide any treatment for his alleged
mental illness." The Court narrowly held that a state could not
constitutionally confine any nondangerous person who could
survive in freedom,79 but the Court explicitly declined to settle the
issue of the right to treatment.8 "
In Addington v. Texas,"1 the Court again failed to
specifically address that issue. The case involved a mother
attempting to commit her son to a state mental hospital for an

7 See id. at 449-53; Roberts, supranote 45, at 100-04. Such analysis derives
from the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, which states that no
person may be deprived of their liberty without due process of law.
75 Plaut, supra note 55, at 450; see Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509
(1972).
76 See Plaut, supra note 55, at 450.
77 O'Conner v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 564 (1975).
78 Id.at 565-6.
79

Id. at 576.

Id.d at 573.

"l Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
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indefinite period of time. 2 At issue was the standard of proof for
civilly committing a person; the Court held that the proper standard
Although some
was "clear and convincing evidence." 3
commentators have interpreted Addington to also mean that
"sexually violent predator statutes do not have to include a
treatment component,"8' nothing in the case itself explicitly
demands such a conclusion. The actual standard of care due to the
confined person is never delineated, and does not constitute even a
side issue in the case.
Youngberg v. Romeo 5 also failed to settle the matter of the
right to treatment regarding involuntarily committed persons.
Youngberg involved a severely mentally retarded young man who
had been committed to the State's care by his mother. The mother
later sued the hospital, claiming (among other things) that the
hospital failed to provide adequate training for her son. 6 The Court
held that a committed retarded person's "liberty interests require
87
the state to provide minimally adequate or reasonable training."
Such training would insure that the retarded person's selfmaintenance skills would not deteriorate. The standard for judging
the adequacy of the training was minimal: if a qualified
professional in the appropriate field said that the training sufficed,
then it sufficed - at least for constitutional purposes. 8
According to Youngberg, the courts should henceforward
show proper deferenbe to professional judgment, and presume it
valid.89 Courts should intervene only when "the decision by the
professional is such a standard departure from accepted judgment,
practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible
12

Id. at 420.

" Id. at 432-33.
'4 See Morris, supra note 11, at 638.
85 Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
86 Id. at 310.
87 Id. at 319.
88 Id. at 321-22.
89 Id. at 323.
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actually did not base the decision on such a judgment."9 Once
again, the Court declined to definitively decide whether the state
could constitutionally commit someone and then refuse to provide
any treatment.
Interestingly, Chief Justice Burger added concurring
opinions to both the O'Connor and Youngberg decisions, 9 ' in
which he adamantly rejected any constitutional right to training or
treatment. Regarding the Youngberg standard of "minimally
adequate training," Burger seemed to consider it merely a logical
subset of a committed person's right to decent care - along with
food, clothing, shelter, and medical care.9' According to the Chief
Justice, the state's provision of such basic human needs justified
the confinement of committed persons. The Constitution never
created any additional "affirmative duty on the State to provide any
particular kind of training."93 The fact that the majority opinions in
O'Connor and Youngberg chose not to incorporate such analysis
into their own reasoning indicates at the very least that the majority
of the court did not actively embrace Burger's views.
While the Supreme Court evaded or ignored the right to
treatment, the Federal circuits took sides. Expanding on the
Supreme Court's Estelle doctrine, the Fourth circuit held that a
prisoner
is entitled to psychological or psychiatric treatment
if a physician or other health care provider,
exercising ordinary skill and care at the time of
observation, concludes with reasonable medical
certainty (1) that the prisoner's symptoms evidence
a serious disease or injury; (2) that such disease or
injury is curable or may be substantially alleviated;
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307,323 (1982).
9' O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 578-89; Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 329-30.

Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 329.
9 Id.at 330.
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and (3) that the potential for harm to the prisoner by
reason of delay or the denial of care would be
substantial. 4
The Tenth Circuit ruled that the state's constitutional duty
to provide medical care to its inmates included psychological or
psychiatric care." However, the Tenth circuit limited this duty
severely in Riddle v. Mondragon96 , holding that such medical care
need only be reasonably designed to meet the routine and
emergency health care of inmates.
The First Circuit, while sympathetic to a right to treatment,
indicated that police power considerations were equally important
to parenspatriaeconsiderations:
[I]t does not follow that [hospital administrators] are
bound to do what the doctors say is best for [the
mentally ill] even if the doctors are unanimous. The
administrators are responsible to the state and to the
public for making professional judgments of their
own, encompassing institutional concerns as well as
individual welfare. Nothing in the Constitution
mechanically gives controlling weight to one set of
professional judgments ... the final responsibility
belongs to the courts.9 7
The Ninth circuit sweepingly declared in Ohlinger v.
Watson 8 that the involuntarily committed have a constitutional
right to such treatment as will give each of them a realistic
opportunity to be cured or to improve his mental condition. The

94 Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1977).

9s Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 574 (10th Cir. 1980)

Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 1996).
7 Cameron v. Tomes, 990 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir. 1993).
9' Ohlinger v. Watson, 652 F.2d 775, 779 (9th Cir. 1980).
96
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court also echoed Judge Bazelon's conclusion in Rouse99 that lack
of funds or resources failed to justify the state's failure to provide
treatment."°
Thus, lacking any clear direction from the Supreme Court,
the Circuit Courts of Appeals adopted a diverse array of legal
doctrines and rationalizations concerning the extent of the right to
treatment.
V.

ADEQUACY OF TREATMENT

When the debate shifts to the adequacy of treatment, more
dilemmas arise, because psychiatric scholarship indicates that
treatment benefits only a small percentage of sex offenders.'0 ' For
example, deploring the rerouting of scarce resources from the truly
mentally ill to the medically ambiguous sex offenders, Dr. James
Reardon"°2 asserts that
the treatment of sex offenders had been declining in
recent years because of the lack of success in curing
Indeed, the
their sexually aberrant behavior.
Washington State Auditor in 1985, suggested that
9 Rouse, 373 F.2d at 457.
100 Ohlinger, 652 F.2d at 779.
101See NATHANIEL J. PALLONE,

REHABILITATING

CRIMINAL

SEXUAL

PSYCHOPATHS, 80-84 (1990); ALAN A. STONE, M.D., MENTAL HEALTH AND
LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION, 184-85 (National Inst. of Health Mongraph
Series, 1975); Anthony D. Oliver, The Mentally DisorderedSex Offender: Facts
and Fictions, 3 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 87, 95 (1982-83). Even the
comparatively optimistic studies show some disconcertingly high rates of
recidivism. See Gordon C. Nagayama Hall, Sexual Offender Recidivism
Revisted: A Meta-Analysis of Recent Treatment Studies, 63 J. CONSULTING &
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 802, 805-08, (1995)(reporting 19% recidivism rate for
treated patients versus 27% for untreated patients).
"o Dr. Reardon is a board-certified psychiatrist specializing in forensic and
institutional psychiatry. He acted as a consultant for the Washington State
Department of Corrections and the Special Offender Center.
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sex offender programs in Washington be
discontinued because they were expensive and no
more effective than incarceration in changing
offender behavior.' 3
Professor Comwell delineates the dilemma concerning
treatment adequacy. On the one hand, without any substantive
requirement for adequate treatment, "state psychiatric hospitals
might provide sex offenders with the most minimal and cheapest
form of therapeutic intervention necessary to relieve the state's
obligation."'" ° On the other hand, too strict a standard might cause
dangerous persons to be released if the treatment produced
disappointing results." 5
Comwell seems to view the second danger as the lesser
evil, and concludes, "At some point, if treatment protocols fail to
produce positive results, treatment ceases to provide a legitimate
basis for commitment that is based, at least in part, on the
provision of care and treatment."'0 6 Such a conclusion begs the
question, however, of what happens if "care and treatment" are
merely ancillary justifications for the commitment.
Shortly after declaring the existence of a right to treatment
in his Rouse v. Cameron opinion, Judge Bazelon expanded on the
courts' role in overseeing the amount and adequacy of treatment."'
Noting that segments of the psychiatric profession insisted that
determining adequacy of treatment was strictly a medical rather
than a legal judgment, Bazelon insisted that courts were the proper
bodies to oversee this issue. 0 8
James D. Reardon, M.D. Sexual Predators:Mental Illness of Abnormality?
A Psychiatrist'sPerspective, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 849, 850 (1992).
(1982-83).
" Cornwell, supranote 50, at1328.
105 See ld. at 1329.
106 Id.
107 373 F.2d at 748.
108 Id.
103
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Doctors, not judges, could formulate standards for
adequate treatment. And experts qualified to
appraise treatment could make at least the initial
determination whether a particular patient was
receiving treatment. The courts could limit their role
to that played in reviewing administrative decisions
a scrutiny of the record to determine whether the
professionals providing and evaluating treatment
have made responsible decisions based upon a
thorough consideration of all the evidence relevant
to the individual case." 9
Professor Grant Morris argues that adequate treatment for
sex offenders may be justified under something resembling an
equal protection argument:
If society can legitimately determine that certain
people can be involuntarily treated for mental
illness, all persons so classified are entitled to equal
treatment regardless of any other status such as
"criminal" that has been attached to them.... [T]he
level of treatment of any artificially disadvantaged
class of patients must be raised to the level of all
other patients." 0
As an example of the abuses that can take place in the
absence of such equal protection analysis, Morris cites the chilling
example of California's use of the drug Anectine as "therapy" for
mentally ill criminals." Anectine induces respiratory arrest by
109Id.
1o

Grant H. Morris, "Criminality" and the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CH. L.

REV. 784, 786 (1969).
"I Id. at 799.
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causing muscle paralysis of the patients' intercostal muscles and
diaphragms. As a result, the fully conscious patients cannot breathe
for a period of one and one half to two minutes. 112 During that
period, technicians "suggested" that the patients improve their
behavior. Some of the patients involved had not consented to this
Orwellian therapy." 3
VI.

SELECTING AND IMPLEMENTING TREATMENT

Opposition to such barbaric treatment is simple enough.
The question of what therapy should be used for sex offenders is
far more problematic. At this point in time, there is no consensus in
the medical community on how to treat
sex offenders, or even if
14
they can be successfully treated at all.
One form of treatment is drug therapy.
Pharmologic interventions also have shown
promise, especially antiandrogens, which reduce the
production and effects of the male hormone
testosterone.... Paraphiliacs have been a particular
target
of
treatment
with
MPA
[medroxyprogesterone acetate], based on the belief
that decreasing their levels of testosterone will
diminish the compulsive sexual fantasies that lead
them to commit sex crimes. While initial results
have indicated substantial reductions in deviant
sexual behavior among paraphiliacs treated with
MPA, much is still unknown about this form of
therapy, including its long-term impact on

112

113
114

Id.
Id.

See sources cited supranote 99.
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recidivism and why its success varies dramatically
among subjects."'
Professor Robert Wettstein argues that treatment for sex
offenders is most effective relatively soon after they commit their
crimes." 6 Unfortunately, many sex offenders do not begin any
therapy until years after their crimes.' This is particularly true in
those states that provide little or no treatment for sex offenders
during their criminal sentences, but instead wait and begin such
programs after the offenders have been involuntarily civilly
committed.'
Such a substantial delay causes a number of
difficulties, including the offender creating various distortions and
defenses, which hamper later efforts at treatment.1' 9 The greater the
delay, the greater the difficulty in getting the offender to take
personal responsibility for his actions.!2 ° To make matters worse,
the offender may genuinely experience memory loss regarding the
criminal acts, and consequently reinforce his tendency to
rationalize the situation (i.e. the victim did not really resist).'
Wettstein also states that therapy for sex offenders is most
effective in community settings.12 He wryly observes that prisons
23
hardly constitute the ideal setting for group therapy.
Unfortunately, sex offenders have powerful incentives to not
"'

Comwell, supranote 50, at 1331.

116

Robert M. Wettstein, A Psychiatric Perspective on Washington's Sexually

Violent Predator'sStatute, 15 Puget Sound L. Rev. 597, 617 (1992).

See Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion in Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. at
2093-94, in which he criticizes the Kansas statute's failure to mandate treatment
until "a few weeks prior to the 'anticipated release' of a previously convicted
offender from prison" (referring to KAN. STAT. ANN. §59-24(a)(1) (1994)).
"'

"' Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. at 2093-94.

"9 Wettstein, supra note 116, at 617.
120 Id.
121
"2

"

Id.

Id.at 616.
Id. at 617. "Few, if any, correctional institutions are designed to function as

therapeutic environments, much less actually do so."
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participate in such therapy."' Sex offenders, particularly child
molesters, occupy the "bottom rung" among fellow prisoners;
consequently, pedophiles put themselves in serious danger by
admitting their guilt to such despised offenses. 2 Furthermore,
most maximum security correctional facilities are
violent, threatening, antisocial milieus in which an
inmate is socialized to avoid disclosing personal
weakness
or
vulnerability,
avoid
taking
responsibility for his crime, or reveal himself to be a
sex offender for fear of retaliation. Inmates develop
socially acceptable alibis, which are at odds with the
real crime, to please themselves as well as family
and supporters."'
Whether or not coerced and involuntary treatment actually
succeeds in improving patients' mental illness remains a subject of
medical debate. It is well settled, for example, that involuntary
treatment of controlled substance abusers often yields positive
results for the patient.'27 However, in many instances coerced
treatment of criminals creates obstacles for effective therapy.'28
In enforced treatment, patients come to view their
therapists as their jailers, agents of the state, and
punitive authority figures. Involuntary patients learn
to minimize symptoms, ingratiate their therapists,
and seek forgiveness. The reciprocal, mutual,
trusting relationship in voluntary mental health
treatment is often reduced to a game of

124

Wettstein, supra note 116, at 617.

125

Id.

126

Id.

127 Id. at618.
128

Id.
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manipulations by the patient and staff in involuntary
29
treatment. 1
Further difficulties develop when one considers the form of
the treatment. Many sex offender programs utilize the group
approach, which consists of a number of offenders discussing their
crimes with each other.13 This approach brings with it Fifth
Amendment issues of self-incrimination, particularly for those who
are either appealing their sentences or are seeking parole.' These
programs demand that the offender confess his crimes and take full
responsibility for them. 32 However, no legal privilege exists
between group members or with the mental health professionals
who lead them.' So on the one hand, if the offender refuses to
confess, he cannot enter the programs and receive treatment, and
he may even lose good time and thus serve a longer sentence. 3 4 He
will also lose any opportunity for obtaining a family reunion in
trailers on prison grounds.' On the other hand, if the offender
confesses and enters the program for treatment, any hope of appeal
or early parole is devastated.' 36 The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals in Johnson v. Baker,137 upheld this system and rejected the
prisoners' Fifth Amendment claims.
Wettstein identifies other formidable problems regarding
treatment of sex offenders. The mental health professionals who
work with criminals find themselves under constant pressure to
disclose information about their patients to those decision makers
12

Wettstein, supranote 116, at 618.

10

One example of such a program is the Auburn Correctional Facility's Sex

Offender Program.

To enter this group treatment, inmates must admit their

alleged wrongdoing. See Johnson v Baker, 108 F.3d 10, 11 (2nd Cir. 1997).
131 Id.

132 Id.
133

Id.

134 Id.

135 Id.
136 Id.

137 Id.
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working in the criminal justice system, and those in the civil
system who must decide whether the patients are ready to be
released into society."'
In the absence of significant confidentiality in the
treatment of the sexually violent predator, offenders
are unlikely to ever disclose to their therapist the
extent of past sexual offending, given the stakes of
definite detention under the statute. Offenders have
an obvious incentive to conceal persistent sexually
deviant fantasy and arousal during treatment.'
Also, evaluating the progress of sex offenders in their
treatment programs is almost impossible to do with any
accuracy. 40 Because committed offenders lack access to potential
victims, mental health professionals have little in the way of direct
evidence to determine if offenders are indeed "safe" enough to
rejoin society.' Instead, such professionals must rely on such
indirect evidence as
the offender's acceptance of guilt and personal
responsibility for offending, the offender's ability to
manage stressful life events in an acceptable
manner,
behavior
during
hospitalization,
achievement
of
maximum
benefit
from
hospitalization, and change in community
circumstances during hospitalization (e.g. absence
of victims in a new neighborhood).'42

131

See Wettstein, supranote 116, at 620.

139

Id.

140

See Id. at 621.

141

See

142

Id.

Id.
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Wettstein further notes that although most mental health
programs for criminals involve conditional or gradual release
programs with appropriate support services, sex offender programs
rarely allow for gradual release due to the dangerousness of the
patients.1 43 As a result, professionals lack the44ability to monitor the
patients' eventual reemergence into society.1
Because of the lack of accurate data concerning the
patients' progress, clinicians must rely on their own subjective
predictions of future dangerousness when determining whether
offenders should be released.1 45 Not surprisingly, clinicians tend to
146
make conservative guesses and resist releasing sex offenders.
Overestimating future dangerousness affects the diagnosis of all
classes of mentally ill persons, but this phenomenon is especially
prevalent with sex offenders.1 47 "Sex offenders typically provoke
strong countertransference feelings or primitive emotional feelings
such as rage and vengeance in evaluators and therapists. 148
Further dilemmas arise concerning treatment adequacy
when confronting the stubborn fact that the mental abnormalities of
sex offenders as defined in predator statutes are often legal
constructs rather than medically recognized diseases. For example,
District Attorney Boerner concedes that the definition of mental
abnormality in the Washington statute is legal rather than
medical. 149 Such a development bothers Cornwell not at all:
It is not 'perverse', moreover, to subject individuals
to civil detention based on a mental abnormality
potentially leading to future sexual misconduct
when they were previously determined to be
141 See

Wettstein, supranote 116, at 622.

144See Id.

145See Id. at

621, 625.
See Id. at 625.
147 See Id. at 625-26.
141 Wettstein, supranote 116, at 626.
149 Boerner, supra note 52, at 569.
146
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sufficiently responsible to deserve criminal
punishment for similar activity. Just as the
conceptualization of mental illness may differ in
clinical and legal contexts, so too does its definition
vary from one legal purpose to another. 50
Many professionals in the medical community find such an
embrace of legal definitions of mental illness as unethical and
dangerous. In fact, members of the Washington State Psychiatric
Association (WSPA) openly accused the Governor's Task Force on
Community Protection of virtually abandoning psychiatric science
for the purpose of declaring an entire class of criminals as mentally
ill.' Dr. James Reardon commented on the total absence of
psychiatrists on the Task Force, and criticized lay bodies such as
legislatures for legislating psychiatric diagnosis and treatment.'
To illustrate the point, Reardon explained that "A psychiatrist's
definition of 'mental disorder' includes the loss of contact with
reality, confusion, loss of reason, or hallucinations", but that many
53
sex offenders display none of these symptoms.
Reardon's conclusion that sex offenders' mental
abnormalities do not constitute an actual serious medical disorder
is far from universally held. In fact, Justice Thomas discusses in the
Kansas v. Hendricks decision the fact that important segments of
the psychiatric community accept pedophilia as a serious mental
disorder.'54 Justice Thomas acknowledges the disagreement within

"o
',

Cornwell, supra note 50, at 1334.
Reardon, supranote 103, at 849-50.

Id.
Id. at 852.
'" 117 S.Ct. at 2081. Justice Thomas cites: American Psychiatric Association,
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders xxiii, xxvii (4th ed.
1994); 1 American Psychiatric Association, Treatments of Psychiatric
Disorders,617-633 (1989); Abel & Rouleau, Male Sex Offenders, Handbook of
152

153

Outpatient Treatment of Adults 271 (M. Thase, B. Edelstein & M. Hersen, eds.

1990).
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the psychiatric professions concerning this issue, but nevertheless
holds,
These disagreements, however, do not tie the State's
hands in setting the bounds of its civil commitment
laws. In fact, it is precisely where such
disagreement exists that legislatures have been
afforded the widest latitude in drafting such statutes.
Cf. Jones v. UnitedStates, 463 U.S. 354, 365, n. 13
... As we have explained regarding congressional
enactments, when a legislature 'undertakes to act in
areas fraught with medical and scientific
uncertainties, legislative options must be especially
broad and courts should be cautious not to rewrite
legislation."55
In this instance, the Court shrewdly uses the medical controversy
to its advantage, as an affirmative reason to grant deference to the
state legislatures.
VII.

THE KANSAS V. HENDRICKS RULING

This question leads directly to the Kansas v. Hendricks'56
decision, and the Kansas legislature's enactment of the Sexually
Violent Predator Act in 1994. Justice Thomas began the majority
opinion by discussing the Kansas legislature's rationale for passing
the statute. In repeated instances, the legislature referred to the
necessity of treating sex offenders:
[A] small but extremely dangerous group of
sexually violent predators exist who do not have a
mental disease or defect that renders them
...117 S.Ct. at 2081, note 3.
156

117 S.Ct. 2072 (1997).
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appropriate for involuntary treatment pursuant to
the [general involuntary civil commitment statute].
.. The legislature further finds that the prognosis for
rehabilitating sexually violent predators in a prison
setting is poor, the treatment needs of this
population are very long term and the treatment
modalities for this population are very different than
the traditional treatment modalities for people
appropriate for commitment under the [general
involuntary civil commitment statute] . . . [We
mandate] a civil commitment procedure for the
long-term care and treatment of the sexually violent
predator. 57 [emphasis supplied].
However, when invalidating the statute, the Kansas Supreme Court
asserted that the state's professed interest in treatment was simply
a convenient rationale for keeping sex offenders locked away
permanently:
It is clear that the overriding concern of the
legislature is to continue the segregation of sexually
violent offenders from the public. Treatment with
the goal of reintegrating them into society is
incidental, at best. The record reflects that treatment
for sexually violent predators is all but nonexistent.
The legislature concedes that sexually violent
predators are not amenable to treatment under [the
existing Kansas involuntary commitment statute]. If
there is nothing to treat under [that statute], then
there is no mental illness. In that light, the
provisions of the act for treatment appear somewhat
'
disingenuous. 58
157

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994).

,' In re Hendricks, 259 Kan 246,258 (1996).
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Justice Thomas responded by addressing two competing
interpretations of this reasoning: a) that sex offenders are
untreatable, or b) even if they're treatable, treatment may not
constitute the state's overriding concern. 5 9 As for the first
interpretation, Justice Thomas responded:
[W]e have never held that the Constitution prevents
a State from civilly detaining those for whom no
treatment is available, but who nevertheless pose a
danger to others. A State could hardly be seen as
furthering a "punitive" purpose by involuntarily
confining persons afflicted with an untreatable,
highly contagious disease 16 ... Similarly, it would
be of little value to require treatment as a
precondition for civil confinement of the
dangerously insane when no acceptable treatment
existed. To conclude otherwise would obligate a
State to release certain individuals who were both
mentally ill and dangerous simply because they
could not be successfully treated for their
161
afflictions.
One searches the majority opinion in vain for the criteria or the
burden of proof concerning the state actually proving that a certain
mental illness, or a specific individual, is untreatable. Such criteria
is crucial, because a determination of "untreatability" effectively
sentences an offender to permanent incarceration, without hope of
parole or future treatment. It's also unclear under what (if any)
circumstances this finding of "untreatability" might be appealed or
reviewed in the future.
1'9 Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. at 2084-85.

"r Cf Robinson v California, 370 US 660, 666 (1962).
Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. at 2084.
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Moving to the second interpretation (that the Kansas
Supreme Court held that Hendricks' condition was treatable, but
that treatment was not the State's overriding concern, and that no
treatment was being provided), Justice Thomas responded that it
suffices that an "ancillary purpose of the Act was to provide
treatment,"162 and therefore the Court could conclude that the Act
was not punitive. Justice Thomas pointed to provisions in the Act
which seemed to provide for treatment to bolster his point that the
civil incarceration was not punishment. 63 The inference one
derives from this argument is that if a statute failed to make any
provisions for treatment, then the Act could be seen as punitive.
Therefore the incarceration would still be criminal rather than civil,
and would violate the ex postfacto and double jeopardy clauses in
the Constitution.
In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy directly
addressed this troubling area:
If the object or purpose of the law had been to
provide treatment but the treatment provisions were
adopted as a sham or mere pretext, there would have
been an indication of the forbidden purpose to
punish... [W]hile incapacitation is a goal common
to both the criminal and civil systems of
confinement, retribution and general deterrence are
reserved for the criminal system alone... If civil
confinement were to become a mechanism for
retribution or general deterrence, or if it were shown
that mental abnormality is too imprecise a category
to offer a solid basis for concluding that civil
detention is justified, our precedents would not
64
suffice to validate it.
162 Id.
163
164

Id. at 2084-85.
Id. at 2087.
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Justice Kennedy explicitly states what Justice Thomas only implies
- that the state must offer some sort of adequate treatment for
involuntarily committed sex offenders in order for statutes like the
one in Kansas to pass constitutional muster. Unfortunately, Justice
Kennedy does not delineate the criteria for determining sham
treatment statutory provisions.
The four dissenters, led by Justice Breyer, indicate that the
Kansas statute itself did not provide the requisite treatment, and
consequently indulged in the "forbidden purpose to punish."
Justice Breyer quotes relevant testimony that demonstrated that
"confinement takes place in the psychiatric wing of a prison
hospital where those whom the Act confines and ordinary prisoners
are treated alike. ' 165 He further notes:
[A] statutory scheme that provides confinement that
does not reasonably fit a practically available,
medically oriented treatment objective, more likely
reflects a primarily punitive legislative purpose...
The Act explicitly defers diagnosis, evaluation, and
commitment proceedings until a few weeks prior to
the "anticipated release" of a previously convicted
offender from prison. But why, one might ask, does
the Act not commit and require treatment of sex
offenders sooner, say soon after they begin to serve
their sentences? [W]hen a State decides offenders
can be treated and confines an offender to provide
that treatment, but then refuses to provide it, the
is fully incapacitated
person
refusal to treat while a 16
6
punitive.
begins to look

165

'6

Id. at 2090.
Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. at 2092-94, 2096.
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But even after all this, Justice Breyer insists that the Hendricks
case doesn't require the Court to decide "whether the Due Process
Clause always requires treatment,"167 and he 6gives as an example
an untreatable mentally ill, dangerous person.1 1
As mentioned before, the concept of untreatability creates
its own legal dilemmas. Justice Breyer, like Justice Thomas, avoids
the potential pitfalls of that scenario. Instead, he asserts, "[T]he
legal question before us is whether the Clause forbids Hendricks'
confinement unless Kansas provides him with treatment that it
concedes is available.169 In responding to this question, Breyer
and the dissenters conclude that a right to treatment does exist,
when treatment is available 7
The sticky questions remain: does the term "available"
mean possible, feasible, affordable, or generally accepted? Does
the qualifier "when treatment is available" actually create an
incentive for states to make treatment unavailable so they won't
have any legal obligations to sex offenders? The Court's failure to
make a definitive statement squarely addressing the right to
treatment for the involuntarily committed, or to design a workable
legal test for determining the adequacy of treatment, will cause
further confusion and speculation among courts and legislatures on
both the state and federal levels.
CONCLUSION

In Kansas v. Hendricks, the Supreme Court's majority
opinion explicitly upheld the constitutionality of sexually violent
predator statutes. Indeed, the dissenting opinion agrees that such
statutes are constitutionally permissible, as long as the statutory

167
168
169
170

Id. at2090.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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scheme confines persons in the context of "a practically available,
medically oriented treatment objective. '7
Unfortunately, the majority opinion fails to provide a clear
test for future courts to determine the constitutionality of other
sexually violent predator statutes. However, it does cite a list of
important factors that the Court used to judge the Kansas statute:
Where the State has 'disavowed any punitive
intent'; limited confinement to a small segment of
particularly dangerous individuals; provided strict
procedural safeguards; directed that confined
persons be segregated from the general prison
population and afforded the same status as others
who have been civilly committed; recommended
treatment if such is possible; and permitted
immediate release upon a showing that the
individual is no longer dangerous or mentally
impaired, we cannot say that it acted with punitive
172
intent.
Similar factors could be weighed by future courts to determine the
constitutionality of future state laws in this area.
As for the right to treatment, the majority opinion implies
17
but does not explicitly mandate that such a right exists.
However, at least five of the justices (the four dissenters and the
concurring Justice Kennedy) take great care to make the point that
a sexually violent predator statute lacking a treatment component,
or containing a sham treatment component, would not pass
constitutional muster.17 1 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court once
again fails to provide sufficient direction; the Court neglects to
171
172
'7
7

Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. at 2092.
Id. at 2085.
Id. at2084-85.
Id. at 2087, 2092.
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articulate a clear test for determining the adequacy of a statute's
treatment provisions. As a result, state legislatures will continue to
work in the dark, and lower courts will continue to promulgate a
diverse array of standards and rationales for treatment provisions.
The right to treatment for involuntarily committed sex offenders
remains amorphous, undefined and indistinct.

